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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Utah Code §78-2a-3(2)(h) because this is an appeal from the district court in a
domestic relations matter.
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND LAW
This Court is to review the lower court's application of Rule 60 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of Rule 60 is attached to the Appellant's brief.
The elements of fraud in Utah are: 1) a representation; 2) concerning a
presently existing material fact; 3) which was false; 4) which the representor either
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he or she had insufficient
knowledge on which to base such representation; 5) for the purpose of inducing the
other party to act upon it; 6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance

of its falsity; 7) did in fact rely upon it; 8) and was thereby induced to act; 9) to his
or her injury and damage. See Robinson v. Tripco Investment, Inc., 21 P.3d 219,
223 (Utah Ct. App, 2000).
Regarding Duress: Restatement (Second) of Contracts §175 and §176, as
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Andreni v. Hurtgren, 860 P.2d 916 (Utah
1993) ("We . . . explicitly adopt the legal standards of duress set forth in sections
175 and 176 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts55-p. 921).
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the lower court error in requiring the Appellant to carry the burden to
present evidence to support her claims: 1) that she lacked capacity to enter into a
contract when she signed the Stipulation Agreement; 2) that she was under duress
when she signed the Stipulation Agreement; and 3) that the Appellee and counsel
for the Appellee made misrepresentations of material fact on which she relied when
she entered into the Settlement Agreement?
The lower court's application of the law will be reviewed for correctness.
Generally, the appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions for
correctness, according the trial court no particular deference. Orton v. Carter, 970
P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998).
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Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion in finding that the
Appellant had failed to meet her burden to prove: 1) that she lacked capacity to
enter into a contract when she signed the Stipulation Agreement; 2) that she was
under duress when she signed the Stipulation Agreement; and 3) that the Appellee
and counsel for the Appellee made misrepresentations of material fact on which she
relied when she entered into the Settlement Agreement?
Absent an abuse of discretion in its ruling on the Appellant's Rule 60(b)
motion, the lower court's determination will not be disturbed. Katz v. Pierce, 732
P.2d 92 (Utali 1986). The lower court's factual determination is entitled to
deference on appeal and not reversible absent clear error. Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7
P.3d 783, 787 (Utah, 2000).
"In this case we accept the universal and salutary rule that judgments must be
sustained; that they cannot for anything but the most compelling reasons be set
aside, and that extrinsic fraud must be the basis for such an attack." Rice v. Rice,
212 P.2d 685, 688 (Utali 1949); see also Haner v. Haner, 373 P.2d 577 (Utali 1962).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The matter before the Court concerns an issue of "buyer's remorse" in regard
to a Settlement Agreement that was the basis for a stipulated decree of divorce,
entered by the district court on June 7, 2004. The Appellant entered into a
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Stipulation with the Appellant on May 3, 2004. She now wishes to set aside the
lower court's ruling that the Settlement Agreement is a binding contract, and that
the Appellant failed to meet her burden to prove that she was "deceived", "stressed
out", "depressed" and "under duress" when she entered into the Stipulation. As set
forth hereafter, the facts in the record before the court below establish that the
Appellant was, in fact, the driving force in preparing the terms set forth in the
Stipulation, was a willing participant, and was not deceived, stressed out, depressed,
or under duress at anytime throughout the divorce process. As such, her appeal
should be denied because the lower court's decision correctly applied Utah law, and
was not an abuse of discretion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS BEFORE THE LOWER COURT
1.

The Appellee and Appellant, Melanie Sweet ("Melanie") were married on

May 7, 1993. See Affidavit of James Sweet at 7 (Record at 119).
2.

In April 2004, Melanie informed the Appellee that she was still having a

relationship with aprison inmate. See Affidavit of James Sweet at 7 (Rec. at 120).
3.

The parties discussed getting a divorce. Melanie informed the Appellee that

she wanted to discover who she really was, "check out her options", and get on with
her life. See id at 9 (Record at 120).
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4.

The Appellee hired Steven Tycksen to represent him in a divorce action. See

icL at 8 (Record at 120).
5.

At that time, the Appellee asked Melanie if she wanted to stay in their house

or move out. During that conversation, Melanie informed the Appellee that she did
not want to take care of the house and wished to move out. She told the Appellee
that she wanted him to stay there to raise the children in the house like they had
always planned. See id. at 3 (Record at 121).
6.

Melanie went to the Appellee's place of work with apartmt/condo brochures

and asked for his help in looking for anew place. See id. at 14(Rec. at 121).
7.

The Appellee went with Melanie and together they looked at places for her to

stay. They visited several apartments and condos, then sat down together and went
over Melanie's finances to determine whether it would be better to rent a place or
purchase a condo. See id. at 15 (Record at 121-22).
8.

During their search, they found a place that Melanie wanted to live in, and

she later moved into that apartment. See id. at 16 (Record at 122).
9.

Melanie moved from the marital home to her apartment on April 28, 2004.

See Affidavit of Biyce Ivan Bills, at 4 (Record at 131).

10.

During the move, Melanie was very happy and spoke openly with her

nephew Bryce Bill, telling him that "this was best for both of them" and that "they
would both be better off and a lot happier". See id. at 5 (Record at 131).
11.

Melanie gave no indication that she was depressed, despondent, or feeling

like she was being forced to move. To the contrary, she seemed genuinely happy,
to be doing what she wanted, and openly stated that she was happy about the move.
See id at 6 (Record at 131).
12.

On the other hand, the Appellee was visibly upset and told Bryce Bill that he

was upset that his wife was moving out. See id. at 7 (Record at 131).
13.

The Appellee has never visited Melanie's residence unless she first invited

him over. For example, on their wedding anniversary, he went over and they ended
up spending the night together. See Affidavit of James Sweet, at 17 (Rec. at 122).
14.

Although Melanie has offered the Appellee a key to her residence on several

occasions, he has never accepted one. See id. at 19 (Record at 122).
15.

The Appellee has never taken any of Melanie's mail, but does have a safety

deposit box, which contains the letters that Melanie gave him in 2003, regarding her
relationship with ha' boyfriend, who was in prison at that time. See id. at 21 (Rec.
at 122).
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16.

The Appellee wanted the divorce to be fair for both of the parties, and they

discussed whether they would need to litigate the divorce or if they could sit down
and work the divorce terms out on their own. Melanie informed the Appellee that
she did not want to hire an attorney. See id. at 22 (Record at 122-23).
17.

The parties discussed finalizing the divorce before Melanie5s boyfriend was

released from prison on May 11, 2004, so both of than could go on with their
personal lives. See id. at 23 (Record at 123).
18.

The Appellee informed Melanie that he had hired Mr. Tycksen as his

attorney, who could write up their divorce terms once the parties mutually agreed to
them. See id. at 24 (Record at 123).
19.

The Appellee asked Melanie to write up the terms of their divorce as she

wanted them so they could later meet and discuss them. See id. at 26 (Rec at 123).
20.

Melanie prepared the terms of their divorce on her own, and the parties met

and discussed them. During that meeting, their discussion was very easy going and
cordial. Melanie's thorough preparation helped to identify their respective interests
in the terms of the divorce. See id. at 27 (Record at 123).
21.

The terms of divorce that Melanie prepared included the visitation schedule

with their children. At the time, the Appellee was concerned that she might get
tired of the schedule that she wanted (having visitation during the day with the
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children until he got home at night), but she insisted that she wanted it that way.
See id at 28 (Record at 123).
22.

During their discussion, the Appellee went through the terms and changed

some of the wording, including;
a.
Adding wording that the children would not be in the presence of
convicted felons,
b.
Adding wording that would give Melanie more than Vi of their
vacation credits at the parties5 time share, and
c.
The Appellee also added language that Melanie would donate the
lingerie she had purchased in anticipation of meeting her boyfriend to
charity. They both laughed and crossed it out. See id. at 30 (Record at 124).
23.

When they finished the meeting, Melanie told the Appellee that she felt good

about the terms they had agreed to and wanted those terms. See id. at 32 (Rec. at
124).
24.

On April 22, 2004, Melanie drafted and faxed to Mr. Tycksen's office the

terms she and the Appellee had previously agreed to. See Transcript of Hearing,
dated November 10, 2004 ("Tr") at 20:6-21:2 (Record at 238); see also Affidavit of
Steven C. Tycksen, at 6 (Record at 135); Fax, dated April 22, 2004, attached thereto
(Record at 140-42).
25.

Up until that time, Mr. Tycksen had not met with Melanie nor prepared any

documents for the parties to review for their divorce. See Tr. at 20 (Record at 238);
see also Affidavit of Steven Tycksen at 7 (Record at 135).
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26.

Based upon the written terms supplied by Melanie via fax from her work,

Mr. Tycksen's office prepared a Stipulation, Decree of Divorce, and Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. See Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 8 (Rec. at 135).
27.

The parties later met at the office of Mr. Tycksen on April 26, 2004. See Tr.

at 20 (Record at 238); see also Affidavit of James Sweet, at 33 (Record at 124);
Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 9 (Record at 135).
28.

Melanie went to that meeting on her own accord, and everyone was friendly

and cordial throughout the meeting. See Tr. at 18-20 (Record at 238); see also
Affidavit of James Sweet, at 34 (Record at 124); Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at
10 (Record at 136).
29.

During that meeting, Mr. Tycksen twice explained to Melanie that he was

acting only as the Appellee's attorney and explained her rights, including her right
to have an attorney. See Tr. at 19:17-20:4, 24:2-4 (Record at 238); see also
Affidavit of James Sweet, at 36 (Record at 125); Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 11
(Record at 136).
30.

Melanie exhibited no signs of stress or duress during that meeting. See

Affidavit of James Sweet, at 35 (Record at 125); Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 12
- 1 4 (Record at 136).

n

31.

Melanie admitted that she knew what she was doing when she and the

Appellant met with the Appellant's attorney. See Tr. at 19:13-15 (Record at 238).
32.

During that meeting, the parties reviewed the Stipulation, Decree of Divorce,

and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and negotiated changes and made
edits that they wanted to have included in the documents Mr. Tycksen had drafted.
See Affidavit of James Sweet, at 37 (Record at 125); Affidavit of Steven Tycksen,
at 1 2 - 1 4 (Record at 136).
33.

Melanie appeared quite happy and friendly. She expressed her interest in

quickly terminating the marriage, and took an active part in discussing the terms of
the Stipulation. See Affidavit of James Sweet, at 38 (Record at 125).
34.

At the end of the meeting, Melanie expressed that she found the agreed to

terms of the Stipulation to be fair and what she wanted them to be. See Affidavit of
James Sweet, at 38 (Record at 125); see also Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 13
(Record at 136).
35.

After the meeting on April 26, 2004, Mi*. Tycksen made edits to the

Stipulation, pursuant to the parties' requests, and asked Melanie to review the
Stipulation, Decree of Divorce, and Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law prior
to their next meeting. See Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 15 (Record at 136).
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36.

A second meeting was held at Mr. Tycksen's office on May 3, 2004, to

review the final documents before signing. See Affidavit of James Sweet, at 39
(Record at 125); Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 16 (Record at 136-37).
37.

Melanie went to that meeting on her own accord. See Tr. at 19-20 (Record at

238); see also Affidavit of James Sweet, at 40 (Record at 125); Affidavit of Steven
Tycksen, at 17 (Record at 137).
38.

Melanie read through the documents, appeared quite happy that the

Stipulation was complete, and again expressed that it was what she wanted it to be.
See Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 18 (Record at 137).
39.

Before the parties signed the Stipulation, Mr. Tycksen set the documents

aside and again explained to Melanie that he only represented the Appellee as his
attorney. He was very direct, and explained that she had the right to have her own
attorney, and have her attorney review the documents. See Affidavit of James
Sweet, at 41 (Record at 125); Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 19 (Record at 137).
40.

The Appellee told Melanie not to sign the Stipulation if she did not think it

was fair. He wanted the divorce to be fair to both of them, and he did not want to
later end up in Court if there was something she did not like in the Stipulation. See
Affidavit of James Sweet, at 43 (Record at 126).
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41.

Melanie responded that she did not wish to hire an attorney, and that she

considered the terms of their Stipulation to be fair and reflected what she wanted.
See Affidavit of James Sweet, at 42, 44 (Record at 125, 126).
42.

The parties then signed the Stipulation before a notary public. See Affidavit

of James Sweet, at 45 (Record at 126); Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 20 (Record
at 137); see also Affidavit of Rachael A. Stocking, at 4 (Record at 145).
43.

Melanie was neither pressured nor under any duress to sign the Stipulation

and signed it of her own free will and choice. See Affidavit of James Sweet, at 46
(Record at 126); Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 20 - 21 (Record at 137); Affidavit
of Rachael A. Stocking, at 5 - 7 (Record at 145).
44.

The Appellee asked Melanie if she would agree to pay half of Mr. Tycksen'

fees. She said that she would. See Affidavit of James Sweet, at 47 (Record at 126).
45.

The parties left Mr. Tycksen's office together joking and holding hands. See

Affidavit of James Sweet, at 48 (Record at 126); Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 21
(Record at 137); Affidavit of Rachael A. Stocking, at 7 (Record at 145).
46.

There was no pressure placed on Melanie throughout the divorce process,

and it was through Melanie's own initiative in drafting and editing the terms of our
divorce, and providing them to Mr. Tycksen, that the divorce moved forward. See
Affidavit of James Sweet, at 49 (Record at 126).
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47.

The Appellee never acted to deceive nor did he deceive Melanie during the

process of their divorce. See id. at 50 (Record at 126).
48.

The Appellee has never threatened to take the children away from Melanie,

and he has always encouraged the children to have a close relationship with their
mother. See id. at 51 (Record at 126).
49.

Melanie returned later to Mr. Tycksen's office to sign title transfer

documents. At that time, Melanie again appeared happy and pleased with the terms
of the divorce. See Affidavit of Steven Tycksen, at 22 (Record at 137); see also
Affidavit of Rachael A. Stocking, at 8 (Record at 145).
50.

In May or June, while the parties were in the process of getting a divorce,

friends of both the Appellee and Melanie visited with them in the marital home.
Although the parties were separated and in the process of getting divorced, Melanie
appeared very friendly and casual, and exhibited no signs of stress. See Affidavit
of James Todd Lambert, at 7 - 8 (Record at 148).
51.

Regarding Melanie5s ability to enter into a contract, the Lower court found

that "the information that has been submitted in this case falls far short of showing
that Ms. Sweet lacked contractual capacity. See Tr. at 4:17-19 (Record at 238).
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52.

Regarding the duress, Judge Quinn found: "The affidavits that have been

submitted, in my opinion, fall way short of showing that her will was overcome by
contractual duress." See Tr. at 5:14-16 (Record at 238).
53.

The lower court appropriately concluded: "I remain of the view that there

hasn't been anything presented in this case that would justify my setting aside the
judgment under Rule 60(b), so I'm denying the motion." See Tr. At 30:17-20
(Record at 238).
ARGUMENT
L

Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal are Improper and Should be
Thrown Out
The Appellant sought to have the district court set aside the parties' Decree

of Divorce pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) [mistake] and (3) [fraud] of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Verified Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to
Set Aside the Decree of Divorce, dated July 12, 2004, at pp. 1, 6-7 (Record at 72,
77-78). That motion was denied, and is the subject of this appeal. The Appellant
now seeks relief on appeal for the first time from this Court by arguing Rule
60(b)(6) as well. See Brief of the Appellant at pp. 11-16, 19-20.
Rule 60(b) states in relevant part:
(b) Mistakes; indadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
16

following reasons: ... (6) Any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of judgment.
The Appellant has also argued for the first time on appeal that the standards
used to invalidate a marriage contract as opposed to a common, or arm's-length
contract are different. These arguments were never asserted in the court below.
The Appellant's new arguments all find their basis in equity, and although they are
separately argued in the Appellant's brief, the arguments regarding 1) contract
invalidation (see Brief of the Appellant at pp. 14-16), 2) equity (see Brief of the
Appellant at p. 14), and 3) public policy are all different approaches to the same
argument for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) (see Brief of the Appellant at pp. 19-20),
which is a new argument raised for the first time on appeal. Since these three
arguments were not argued in the court below and have been raised for the first
time on appeal, they should be summarily dismissed. It is improper for the
Appellant to raise an argument under Rule 60(b)(6) for the first time on appeal.
"[I]ssues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal." Monson
v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). Since the Appellant did not pursue an
argument under Rule 60(b)(6) before the district court, she cannot do so now for the
simple reason that the Court of Appeals cannot review a decision that has not been
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made. Accordingly, the arguments made for relief pursuant to Rule60(b)(6), should
fail.

Notwithstanding that the Appellee believes this argument to be procedurally
dispositive of the Rule 60(b)(6) issue, the Appellee will deal with the arguments on
their merits hereafter.
Contracts Between Spouses
The Appellant knowingly entered into a valid stipulation with the Appellee.
Parties are bound by their stipulations. In United Factors v. T.C., 445 P.2d 766
(Utah 1968), the Utah Supreme Court observed:
[T]hat where parties . . . stipulate that a decree may be entered in
conformity thereto, such contract, if lawful, has a binding effect on the
decree which may be entered. It has all the binding effect of findings
of fact and conclusions of law made by the court upon the evidence.
United Factors, 768 (citations omitted)(emphasis added); see also State v.
Seventy-Three Thousand One Hundred Thirty Dollars United States Currency, 31
P.3d 514 (Utah, 2001); Davis v. Davis, 29 P.3d 676 (Utah Ct. App., 2001). Parties
are bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the court, which has the
power to set aside a stipulation entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause.
See First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979).
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The Appellant relies on Reese v. Reese, 984 p.2d 987 (Utah 1987) to support
her contention that the lower court should not have treated the stipulated Settlement
Agreement in the same fashion as an arm's -length contract. Contrary to the
Appellant's argument, Reese did not identify a different standard for reviewing the
validity of marital contracts. Reese dealt with a stipulation that formed the basis for
the lower court's distribution of marital assets in a divorce. In Reese, the Supreme
Court said: "we have explicitly acknowledged the general authority of spouses or
prospective spouses to arrange property rights by a contract that is recognized and
enforced by a court in the event of a divorce." See Reese at 994. The Reese
decision also points out that additional scrutiny should be used only to insure that
the stipulation was in fact a true stipulation. The Supreme Court appropriately
concluded that like prenuptial agreements, in a divorce, "agreements 'concerning
the disposition of property owned by the parties at the time of their marriage are
valid so long as there is no fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure.'" Reese, at
994, quoting in part In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1994) (quoting Huck
v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986)).
Equity
To support her new argument for relief based on principles of equity, the
Appellant argues that this Court should "use [its] discretion to set aside this
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blatantly one sided and unfair decree." It is axiomatic that the Court of Appeals is a
reviewing court, and not a court of equity. Furthermore, although a lower court has
the ability to invalidate an unconscionable stipulation where justice requires
(Mathie v. Mathie, 363 P.2d 779 (Utah 1961)), the lower court in this matter,
(although not even asked to weigh the equities) specifically found that there wasn't
"anything presented in this case that would justify [the court] setting aside the
judgment under Rule 60(b)." See Tr. at p. 30:18-19.
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed this very argument before, and
concluded:
[Melanie's] contention that the court must look behind [her] stipulation
in order to do equity is without merit. . . . [W]hen a decree is based
upon a property settlement agreement, forged by the parties and
sanctioned by the court, equity must take such agreement into
consideration. Equity is not available to reinstate rights and
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one has
come to regret the bargain made. Accordingly, the law limits the
continuing jurisdiction of the court where a property settlement
agreement has been incorporated into the decree, and the outright
abrogation of the provisions of such an agreement is only to be
resorted to with great reluctance and for compelling reasons.
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1250-51 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added and parties'
names inserted).
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The evidence presented before the district court was insufficient to persuade
the court that Melanie should be relieved from the terms of the stipulation that she
authored.
Public Policy
The Appellant argues that public policy would favor not enforcing a
stipulation that was obtained by fraud or duress. The real meat of this argument is
the alleged fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, all of which were specifically found
by the lower court not to have occurred.
Public policy favors courts respecting and deferring to the agreement
between parties. Regarding divorce stipulations, specifically those that settle
property distribution, this Court has held: "Under Utah law there is a 'compelling
policy interest favoring the finality of property settlements."5 Childs v. Callahan,
993 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah Ct. App., 1999); see also Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112,
114 (Utah Ct.App.1998); see also Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830, 832 (Utah
Ct.App. 1987). Public policy supports affirming the lower court's decision absent
clear and convincing evidence of fraud, which burden the appellant failed to sustain
in the court below.
II,

The Appellant Failed to Martial any Evidence that the Trial Court
Erred in its Application of the Law,
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As part of the new argument comparing the treatment of marriage contracts
and common contracts, the Appellant presupposes that the lower court failed to
apply a correct legal standard. The only evidence offered in support of this is
Appellant's quote of a portion of a minute entry wherein Judge Quinn ruled that
evidence that would constitute a defense to a common contract must be presented in
order to satisfy her burden. See Brief of the Appellant, at p. 11. The Appellant also
ignores the contrary evidence that tends to support the lower court's ruling by
simply claiming that the court did not identify a correct standard for invalidating
stipulated agreements between married couples. When cited in its entirety, Judge
Quinn's conclusion of law was not intended to identify a standard per se, but clearly
pointed out that the Appellant had failed to meet her burden to show evidence of
fraud or misrepresentation.
Unlike Default Judgments, Judgments reached pursuant to the
Stipulation of the parties are given significant deference. In order to
set aside a stipulated Decree of Divorce, a party must, at a minimum,
produce evidence that would constitute a defense to a common
contract. In order to show that the Stipulation was procured by
fraud, respondent must show that she reasonably relied on a
misrepresentation of a presently existing material fact. The
Respondent failed to produce evidence which meets this standard.
See Minute Entry, dated December 6, 2004, conclusion f 1 (Record at 241-42)
(emphasis added). Further, the Court indicated in the subsequent paragraphs that
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the Appellant's evidence fell far short of satisfying the burden to prove duress or
mental incapacity. See Minute Entry, dated December 6, 2004, conclusionfflJ2,3
(Record at 241-42).
This Court has repeatedly held that: It is the appellant's burden to
marshall the evidence, citing the appellate court to all the evidence in the
record that would support the determination reached by the trial court and
then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
court below, it is insufficient to support the finding under attack.
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Associates, 881 P.2d 929,
933 (Utah Ct. App., 1994) (emphasis added); citing to Reid v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-90 (Utah 1989). The Appellant bears the burden to
prove that the court erred by marshalling all of the evidence and persuading this
Court that the lower court abused its discretion. The Appellant has failed to do this.
Instead, the Appellant simply points to the lower court's conclusion of law, that
when taken in context was clearly a statement that the Appellant had failed to meet
her evidentiary burden to prove the settlement agreement was based on
misrepresentation or duress. Absent this evidence, the Court applied the correct
standard.
IIL

The Trial Court Properly Exercised it Discretion Based on the Evidence
Before it, and Denied the Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion, Specifically
Finding no Evidence of Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Duress.
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Although a contract between spouses stipulating to the terms of a divorce
may reviewed for coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, (Reese v. Reese,
984 P.2d 987 (Utah 1987)), the Appellant ignores the fact that the lower court
carefully weighed the evidence in this regard, and specifically found that:
Respondent was advised by Mr. Tycksen that he represented
only Petitioner, and that Respondent was free to consult her own
lawyer if she thought that was necessary. . . . The Court found that
Respondent's testimony with respect to misrepresentations to be not
credible. . . . Accepting all of Respondent's evidence as true, it
nevertheless falls short of suggesting alack of contractual capacity. . . .
Accepting all of Respondent's evidence as true, the evidence falls
short of establishing legal duress, or that Petitioner had inappropriately
overcome her will.
See Minute Entry, dated December 6, 2004, Findings of Factffl|459, 11, 13
(Record at 240-41).
The lower court found inadequate evidence to support the allegations of
fraud, misrepresentation or duress. The Appellant is asking this Court now to
reconsider the factual basis for the district court's decision without marshalling the
evidence. This approach is procedurally inappropriate. The Utah Supreme Court
has held that "a factual determination [is] entitled to deference on appeal and not
reversible absent clear error." Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 783, 787 (Utah, 2000).
Without marshalling the evidence Appellant cannot demonstrate clear error in the
lower court's findings, as explained more fully below.
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The parties entered into a valid Stipulation that was accepted by the lower
court. The Appellant subsequently alleged, in a shotgun approach, numerous
unsupported accusations against the Appellee, including that he "deceived" her, that
she was "stressed out", "depressed" and "under duress" to enter into the Stipulation.
However, the Appellant failed in the court below to present any valid and/or
justifiable factual basis or legal cause to nullify the parties' Stipulation and set aside
the Decree of Divorce. Quite to the contrary, the facts before the district court fully
refuted her allegations. As previously presented to the district court:
a.

The Appellee did not kick the Appellant out of the marital home, but the

Appellant chose to move out and the Appellee helped her find a new residence (See
Affidavit of James Sweet at 13 - 19) (Record at 121-22);
b.

The Appellee has never "stalked" the Appellant (See id. at 22 - 26) (Record

at 122-23);
c.

The parties were cordial and friendly with one another throughout the

process of divorce (See 14 at 14 - 19, 20, 22, 23, 2 7 - 3 3 , 35 - 37, 42 - 44, 46 47, 50-52) (Record at 121-27);
d.

The Appellant, herself, initially drafted the terms of the parties' divorce and

later discussed and negotiated those terms with the Appellant on multiple occasions
(See id at 27 - 51) (Record at 123-28);
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e.

Child support was included in the Stipulation to satisfy the requirements of

the law, and the Appellee has never requested nor has Melanie made those
payments (See id. at 54) (Record at 127);
f.

The Appellant exhibited no visible signs of being "stressed out", "depressed"

or "under duress" during the process of the parties' divorce (See id. at 14-20, 22,
27, 28, 3 0 - 3 5 , 37, 38, 41 - 4 7 , 4 9 - 5 7 ) (Record at 121-28), and she has offered
no evidence save her self-serving statements to support that allegation, which itself
was deemed by the lower court to be insufficient to establish duress (See Minute
Entry, dated December 6, 2004) (Record at 141);
g.

The Appellee never threatened, pressured or "forced" the Appellant to enter

and/or sign the Stipulation, and she entered into it on her own free will and choice
(See id at 13-22, 25-32, 34-51) (Record at 121-27);
h.

Mr. Tycksen properly and repeatedly informed the Appellant of her legal

rights (See id. at 36, 41, 42) (Record at 126, 127); see also Minute Entry, dated
December 6, 2004, f4 (Record at 240);
i.

The Appellant voluntarily paid for one-half of Mr. Tycksen's attorney fees

(See id at 47) (Record at 126);
This evidence is more than adequate to sustain the Court's ruling. The
Appellant has marshaled no other evidence. Considering this evidence before the
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lower court, it cannot be said that it was clear error for the court to render a decision
to deny the Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion.
Appellant alleges that she was "stressed out", "depressed", and "in distress"
throughout the parties' divorce process. However, she also alleges that between the
entry of the Decree of Divorce on June 7, 2004 and the time she filed her Motion on
July 12, 2004, she has overcome her alleged depression and stress with help from a
doctor, and is now a more caring and able parent than the Appellee. These claims
contradict each other. It is more plausible and believable, and as previously set
forth, that the Appellant has never been depressed, "stressed out" or "in distress"
during the process of the parties' divorce. She entered into the Stipulation fully
informed of her legal rights and the parties' property. She was neither pressured
nor threatened to enter into the Stipulation. Instead, the Appellant having chosen to
start a new life with another man, prepared the terms of the Stipulation, discussed
them with the Appellee, was pleasant and happy throughout the divorce process,
was eager to conclude the divorce, and ultimately was pleased with the terms she
drafted and agreed to, so she signed the agreement. Furthermore, the Appellant
presented no expert medical evidence to support her claims that she ever suffered
any alleged mental illnesses or is now ova said illnesses. As such, the district court
was not in error when it denied the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Decree of
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Divorce. The lower court appropriately concluded: "I remain of the view that there
hasn't been anything presented in this case that would justify my setting aside the
judgment under Rule 60(b), so I'm denying the motion." See Tr. At 30:17-20.
Based upon the foregoing, the Appellant presented no adequate basis for the
lower court to nullify the parties' Stipulation and set aside the Decree of Divorce.
With the above facts to support its determination, there is no basis for a finding of
clear error that would justify this Court in granting Appellant's appeal.
Accordingly, the lower court properly denied the Appellant's motion to set aside
the decree, and its ruling should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's application of the law was correct considering the facts
pled and the testimony received from the parties. There was no clear error in Judge
Quinn's factual conclusions finding no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or
duress of any kind. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the lower court's ruling
denying the motion to set aside the divorce decree.
DATED this 2j

day of October, 2005.
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SteveirC. Tycksen
Attorney for the Appellee
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